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The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers 
Frege´s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian 
semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of 
his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that 
would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an 
alternative path, that departin1g from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a 
conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more Kantian sense. On this 
basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on 
their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, 
which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. 
Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of 
the a priori.   
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1  This paper is a contribution to the philosophy of mathematics from a non-technically trained 
philosophical perspective, as will become apparent for colleagues in the field. I do not pretend 
it to be otherwise. I, nevertheless, hope it can offer a valuable perspective on these problems. A 
first shorter version of this paper was presented at the conference The Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism 1918-2018, Complutense University Madrid, 28.01.2019.  
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1. Introduction. The Historical Backstage  
Logical Empiricists critically rehabilitated the Kantian epistemic project meant to set 
apart genuine knowledge of the external world from our own contributions to it—a task 
that, though distinctive of philosophy from its very origins, has over and again become 
swallowed up by the outgrowths of different forms of undifferentiated idealisms and re-
enchantments. Their project, though, adopted the specific form of dispelling those 
confusions brought about by misleading grammatical appearances, which often deceive 
us into believing a surplus of phantom realities and the pursuit of pseudo problems. But 
their Verificationist Criterion of Meaning (VCM) aimed nevertheless, as did Kant, to 
separate out experientially based knowledge that could serve scientific progress from 
speculative metaphysics and the possible projection onto the world of human emotions 
and values, characteristic, they thought, of morality and aesthetics—aspects that, 
significantly, Kant did not understand in any experientially based mode either.  
Kant distinguished, however, two different ways that human beings might 
contribute to external world knowledge. These contributions could be due to extra content 
or they could be due to form, to our own form of cognition. The first characterised the 
excesses of transcendent metaphysics, illegitimately enhancing the world with further 
non-experientially based additions of our own. The second, though, constitutes his 
transcendental philosophy with the introduction of synthetic a priori judgments. These 
latter he found not only legitimate but absolutely essential if any knowledge of the world 
were to be possible at all. It is here where the Empiricists, getting rid of what they 
considered unnecessary, and misconceived, a priori conformations of experiential 
knowledge, most strongly departed from Kant. But, in doing away with the whole Kantian 
transcendental apparatus and his conception of synthetic a priori judgments in favour of 
just logic and language, they arguably arrived at much too restrictive criteria, which ended 
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up making their own position untenable—since the removal left an explanatory lacuna 
when it came to giving an account of the constitution of the objects of experience from 
sensory data alone, the explanation of causality and other forms of necessity present in 
even in our most basic scientific laws. How successful their later attempts were to provide 
alternative accounts of these aspects by appeal to logic and language alone is still a 
troublesome issue. None of it obviates the important reasons that spoke against the 
Kantian position on this specific point—not just the revolutionary transformations 
brought about by Non-Euclidian Geometry, Einstein´s Relativity Theory and Quantum 
Mechanics into our scientific picture, but also the increased centrality gained by 
semantics owing to the writings of Bolzano and the later reception of Frege: the first 
appeared to directly contradict the Kantian theory; the second showed how well we could 
do without it. The perfect match between the difficulties of the theory and the incipient 
success of its abandonment, set the conditions for a paradigmatic overturn.  
 
1.1. The Resulting Epistemic Setting 
Once the Empiricists had renounced any other source of knowledge from a provenance 
external to our own, prima facie less mysterious, logico-linguistic equipment, experience 
became the only ground on whose basis to derive and validate our knowledge claims, the 
ultimate and sole criterion of existence. To this end, Russell´s analysis of definite 
descriptions opened up what can be considered the most consequent and properly 
empiricist line of existential analysis. If the grammatical surface can mislead us into 
believing in non-existent objects through deceitful singular terms, the way to expose it is 
precisely to lead them back to the ‘tribunal of experience’. There we could see whether 
or not there was an individuum satisfying the descriptions associated with the term. From 
this perspective, the claim that because our specific theoretical postulates require the 
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existence of such objects they must be taken to exist in some other way, could not be 
taken to hold, simply because there is no other way to exist. Actually, as Coffa (1991, 
109) points out, Russell saw himself as thereby ‘neutralizing the tendency to produce 
false abstractions.’ The kind of things that exist is, of course, a complicated issue, but at 
least we had to be able to find some basis in experience that allows us to confirm or 
disconfirm existential claims or else show how our terms are related to it. Otherwise, the 
whole fuss about transcendent metaphysics would have seemed superfluous were we to 
end up postulating entities as we see fit. The importance of Russell´s theory of 
descriptions was celebrated by Ramsey2 who, following its lead, proposed his famous 
‘Ramsey Sentence’ with the purpose of dealing with theoretical scientific terms in a 
similar way, a proposal that was later elaborately developed by Carnap (1966, Ch.26). As 
in Russell´s case, scientific sentences with singular terms seeming to refer to some 
abstract entities had at least to be seen as conditional to corresponding existential 
sentences from whose truth the truth of the theories would depend. Following this string 
of thought, the Fregean proposal to introduce numbers as abstract objects referred to by 
the corresponding singular terms in mathematical sentences, could scarcely be 
accommodated.  
But the problem in this case was that neither of the options available appeared to 
provide the resources needed to deal with the status of mathematical knowledge—those 
options being either 1) to reduce numbers to experience or 2) to provide an account of 
them through mere logic and language. In the first case, neither a direct reduction of 
Mill’s empiricist type, nor one analogous to Ramsey and Carnap’s treatment of theoretical 
scientific terms, showed any means of success; but neither did the possibilities opened up 
 
2  According to Coffa (1991), Ramsey would have seen in it as one of the greatest achievements 
of the century. 
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by the second—Conceptualism and Formalism—the preferred route of authors such as 
Schlick, Hahn or early Carnap3. Conceptualism, which was Russell´s option after the 
breakdown of Frege´s project, was problematic mainly for two reasons: concepts, even if 
understood as conventions, could not be mere conventions on pain of being absolutely 
hollow and useless; but if they weren’t, showing them to be meaningful required remitting 
them to their verification conditions (as required by the VCM) or, at least, showing 
through an explicit conceptual analysis their ultimate possible connection to experience. 
This implied that there had to be something that these concepts were about. It had to be 
possible to prove whether what was said through them was the case or not, and this 
brought us back to the initial problem. Understanding them as some kind of properties, 
as Russell did, thus made things no better, since it equally required either showing how 
exactly they were to be derived from experience or accepting them as some new kind of 
abstract objects, giving rise to the consequent problems again. Formalism, on the other 
hand, attempted to find a solution by assimilation of them with logic, believing that, at 
least for some concepts, the question of their ‘aboutness’ could be dealt with differently. 
The corresponding concepts would actually concern rules, having more to do with 
relations among objects than referring to any objects or properties. But, far from being 
wholly unproblematic, implicit in this option was the assumption that the status of logical 
laws and our peculiar ‘a priori grasp’ of their necessity was absolutely no issue. Not even 
the conventionalist account, which according to Coffa (1991, Ch 14) would have provided 
the semantic tradition’s solution to the problem of the a priori, can be considered to have 
given an appropriate response to this question. As Prior (1960) exemplified with the case 
of Tonk, the fact that we should set a concept with its corresponding rules of use to run, 
 
3  See, for example, Goldfarb (1998) 
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and then appeal back to those very inferential rules to justify it can be seen as circular4. 
The source of necessity of logical laws was through such explanations in no way 
exhausted. Actually, much of what is at issue here, as we will see later on5, depends on 
this question. But, as an explanation of mathematical statements, Formalism could not 
give an account of their truth in any substantive manner. There are, of course, 
contemporary defences of Formalism of which I cannot pretend to give a proper account 
here, such as Field’s (1980) 6, that ascribe to themselves the capacity to adopt talk of truth. 
But as long as there is nothing independent of those very forms capable of deeming 
mathematical statements true, I do not see how it could be defended that such truth is 
significant in any sense or that it could be nothing more than correct uses made of pre-
given rules. 
The reasons why the attempt to reduce numbers to experience in accordance with 
the route of existential analysis opened up by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions did not 
appear worthy of a try, might not be immediately obvious. So, I think it deserves at least 
a quick look, since it might bring out more clearly the starting point and motivations of 
Frege´s own account. Three possibilities can be distinguished here: 1) direct reduction; 
2) existential conditionalized reduction; 3) functional conditionalized reduction.  
The first can be taken to represent the position defended by Mill, for whom what 
we mean by natural numbers are compilations of objects. Natural number terms would be 
general terms obtained per induction from different sample groups. When we say there 
 
4  Questions of conservativeness and consistency might be appealed to here, but not even in this 
way is the matter clarified. There can be untruthful consistent systems, and non-conservative 
rules might be worth incorporating, forcing consistency to be rearranged. 
5  See 4.2 in this paper. 
6        In accordance with Shapiro (2000, 226) 
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are ‘Five apples on the table’, what we actually mean by ‘five’ is something to be found 
in the apples on the table, something they have in common with groups of five oranges 
or five peaches. The immediate problem, as it appears, is that the fiveness itself is nowhere 
to be experienced in the examples given.  
The second corresponds to a parallel treatment of numbers to theoretical scientific 
terms. Here, we would discard claims containing numbers as singular terms, by way of 
conditionalizing such expressions upon some existential sentence no longer containing 
the term. The main difference with the previous option is that as with theoretical scientific 
terms, number statements would have conditions of application. If a track in a cloud 
chamber justifies claims about ‘neutrino’, the existence of specific compilations of 
objects does so with corresponding number statements. In both cases we assume that the 
application conditions do not exhaust the cognitive content of the terms. This would imply 
the existence of something else, ‘a surplus of content’ as Carnap puts it, going beyond 
what the application basis justifies (the presumed entity neutrino, and the number in 
question). The problem now is that while we can know what it would take to prove the 
existence of the assumed entity in the scientific case, and so make the truth of the initial 
statements dependent upon it, no similar hope is available in the case of numbers. We are 
not able to go beyond compilations of objects to a more adequate candidate of existential 
substitution. The problem of numbers reveals itself, therefore, as being clearly of a quite 
different sort. What makes this option interesting to consider is, though, that 
contemporary critiques of the Neo-Logicist programme (such as Field, 1984)7 argue 
along similar lines to prove its implausibility. They assimilate Frege’s contextual 
introduction of number to a procedure aimed at introducing numbers as abstract objects 
on the basis of what might be seen as application conditions, but with no way to 
 
7  See Wright (2001, 160-164) discussion of this point 
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existentially legitimise the assumed further claim of the existence of numbers—no more 
than we could try to legitimise the existence of God through a conceptual introduction as 
in the Ontological Argument.  
The third option, however, differs from this one and also from Russell´s own 
conceptual solution, coming from an empiricist perspective closer to Frege´s own 
proposal. This I call the ‘Functional Conditionalization’ option. The starting point would 
be the same, that is, the compilations of objects that would deliver the application 
conditions. It would provide the contact point with experience, but again would not 
exhaust the cognitive content of number claims. But now, instead of hoping for a hopeless 
existential candidate upon which to conditionalize the truth of such claims, we would 
make it dependent upon the existence of a recognisable and acceptable function (for 
pragmatic reasons acceptable, perhaps) that could justify the transition from application 
conditions (compilation of objects) to claims about numbers. This brings us into the 
vicinity of Frege´s own functional introduction of numbers, since we could imagine such 
a function in similar terms to Frege’s ‘1-1 correlation’ between the members of different 
compilations. But the point of the reconstruction from this reductionist perspective would, 
rather, be the opposite to Frege’s: to deny the existence of numbers. Since the mediating 
function could just be a man-made one, not itself provided through experience, and since 
from its fulfilment the acceptability of number claims depends, the thereby legitimised 
claims can just be (however else understood) man-made products. The strategy could be 
seen as analogous to a similar treatment of thick moral concepts, which would justify the 
transition from behaviours to values through the fulfilment of a moral function8; the 
attribution of the one to the other being then implicitly registered in the concept. If the 
behaviour fulfils the function, we consider it good in the thereby defined moral sense. In 
 
8  See, for example, Ramirez (2018) 
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our case, the transition from compilations of objects to ‘numerical values’, so to speak, 
would be made possible by a number-building function. That would be the idea. Could a 
response along these lines answer Field’s (1984) type of complaints of having extracted 
an abstract object from an insufficient basis? Here, our result would be obtained through 
a specific mediating operator that takes application conditions as input and obtains 
numbers as output; by each added member to the compilation a successive number. The 
answer to our previous question would be that there is an ‘intermediate reason’ and that 
we have to do with a product, not a discovery. But what could be said of the number term 
so obtained? Does it refer to anything? Can it be considered to be justified in any 
empiricist-satisfying terms through our contact point with experience via application 
conditions? Even if we were to say that we have a constructed referential object, what 
would be its character? In the moral case, we can say that what we obtain is a moral value 
(in the sense of being good for the purpose of the fixed moral standard). But what is it 
that we obtain here? Would it make sense to talk of ‘numerical values’, as I did before 
(bringing, perhaps, the comparison to rely on the equal measurability of benefits, pains, 
lengths, weights or whatever, and arguing that actually the real ‘value’ is the number 
therein)? Would we not then again be required to give an account of their status? Or 
should we talk rather of ‘a substitutive symbol’ for such equivalences or maybe ‘merely 
a term’? But even if we were to adopt a non-problematic position that reduces the 
obtained product to something like a ‘shortage term’ whenever the functional mediation 
is possible, the question is whether an interpretation along these lines is in fact available 
to our empiricist. As Frege´s approach makes clear, and for reasons we will see in a 
minute, the answer is that it is not.  
From this perspective, we might be better able to see the very dimension of the 
solution that Frege proposes, since Frege, I believe, is the one who really makes an 
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attempt to respond to the lacuna left by the Kantian synthetic a priori, not just in the 
philosophy of mathematics but as a whole.  
 
2. Frege´s motivations  
Although Frege was not as moved as others by the discovery of Non-Euclidean Geometry 
to abandon the notion of the synthetic a priori as an explanation of geometrical 
knowledge—nor might he necessarily have been by discoveries in astrophysics—he had 
his own reasons to abandon the realm of spatial and temporal Intuition9, as he saw it, 
when it came to Arithmetic. It was the generality of arithmetical thinking, the certainty 
and necessity of its proofs, the fact that we could not, as he argued, question its basic 
principles without contradicting ourselves, that indicated an intimate connection with our 
own thinking processes. Arithmetical thinking was not simply a specific way of thinking 
but appeared to be our own way of thinking on itself. This would explain the fact that it 
would have such an overall embracing domain: ‘to it belongs not only the actual, not only 
the intuitable but everything thinkable. Should not the laws of number, then, be connected 
very intimately to the laws of thought?’ (Frege 1884, §.14, 21). Since it was logic that 
represented the laws of thought being equally general in character, it had to be possible 
to make this ‘intimate connection’ explicit and show how the concerns of arithmetic arose 
through pure logical thinking. It had to be possible to prove that the reason why 
arithmetical thinking applied with certainty and necessity (Dummett 1991) was because 
 
9  Since Intuition here is meant in a sense akin to the Kantian notion of ‘pure Intuition’ I will use 
it with a capital I, to distinguish it from the idea of (non-sensible) ‘intuition’, understood as some 
special undetermined faculty capable of acquiring knowledge beyond the realm of experience, 
that Kant himself criticises. 
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of its derivability from logical laws and definitions alone.  
But what Frege had set himself to do in his reconstruction of the logical form of 
our discursive thinking about the world, had a much wider reach. It amounted to including 
in the formal laws of logic, and thereby in the analytical realm, the epistemic possibility 
of our knowledge of objects10 and those further necessary structures through which we 
would think about them, capturable themselves, in his view, through potential new, 
creative, conceptual synthesis11,thereby reintroducing back into the field of logic, as I will 
come back to, essential features of the Kantian synthetic a priori.  
Since his analysis of the logical form of linguistic discourse went beyond the mere 
reconstruction of its logical rules to include how such rules referred to objects, it was now 
possible too to reason about objects without the objects themselves; to do so in a universal 
and certain way about whatever objects we could possibly have to do with, and so to 
reason about the world without the world—precisely what would be needed in 
arithmetical thinking, whose objects had those very eternal and universal features too.  
Frege´s Begriffschrift in this way brought logic much nearer to arithmetic. 
However, he thought that despite this communality, mathematics was not simply the same 
as logic but had a topic of its own, a topic it was about; something beyond the mere 
thinking procedures that made its statements true. Mathematical statements could be 
substantively true, and this was for him a non-negotiable idea. The task was, thus, to come 
to identify, through a similar logical procedure, the objects that made mathematical 
 
10  It is quite striking how far Kant’s introduction of his idea of the recognition of transcendental 
objects of understanding is already in line with Frege´s proposal: 
What does one mean, then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct 
from the cognition? It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in 
general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this 
cognition as corresponding to it. (Kant 1781, KrV A104, 231) 
11  See Dummett (1991, 305-36) 
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statements true, thereby giving our logical reasoning not just the capacity to think about 
objects but its own objects to think about. That this should be possible departing from 
mere logic and definitions, required somehow turning the forms of thinking, our very 
mechanism of objectual apprehension, upon themselves in such a way that we obtain a 
new form of second-order synthesis. Something along these lines is suggested by 
Dummett (1991, Ch.4): it would be synthetic in the sense of it being knowledge gained 
by encapsulating a content different from itself. 
From Dummett’s reading, what Frege attempted to do was a matter of dissecting 
some kind of second-order pattern ‘within the expressed thoughts themselves’―the same 
procedure he would have taken himself to have used to come to his logical form in his 
Begriffschrift in recognising the hidden structure lying in our discursive thinking12. It 
would be possible not just to extract conceptual information about the objects we speak 
about, but to build new concepts in grasping the more complex patterns of inferential 
reasoning we were able to discern in our linguistic constructions. It is this very idea of 
creatively recognising new patterns whose justification would be independent of 
experience, that in my view very much resembles a form of synthetic a priori 
knowledge—the difference being, of course, the absence of reference to experience or 
Intuition. But I leave further discussion of this until later. However, in a parallel sense 
Frege would see it as possible to extract a pattern to arithmetical reasoning that would lay 
open what it is, we are referring to in talking about numbers. So, how is this to be 
understood? 
 
12  The example he gives to illustrate this possibility is how it would be possible to ‘dissect’ a 
complex pattern from the proposition ‘Either Jupiter is larger than Neptune and Neptune is 
larger than Mars, or Mars is larger than Neptune and Neptune is larger than Jupiter’, into the 
pattern ‘Either Jupiter is larger than x and x is larger than Mars, or Mars is larger than x and 
x is larger than Jupiter’. Which then can be captured with the concept ‘Intermediate in size 
between Jupiter and Mars’ It would require understanding the whole proposition, and not as 
a derived result from its components, to obtain the pattern. (Dummett (1991, 40-41) 
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Frege´s contextual introduction of the concept of number in Grundlagen attempts 
to explain the identity of what is referred to by the concept of number through an 
equivalence relation. The concept of being ‘equinumerous’ between two concepts is 
explained via an identity relation with a 1-1 correlation between the members of each 
concept.  
The number of Fs = the number of Gs if and only if there is a one – one 
correlation between the Fs and the Gs 
The question is, therefore, what exactly is being done here? Dummett would say that 
Frege is attempting to explain the concept of number in terms of a new synthesis exercised 
upon the correlation 1-1 between the concepts on the right-hand side. That is, what this 
new synthesis records with the concept of ‘equinumerous’ is a pattern found in the 
established correlation on the right-hand side. There is i) the correlation 1-1- and there is 
ii) the recording of the pattern, being thereby created through a new concept: the concept 
of the specific number. This is supposedly the idea. But, first of all, what is the pattern 
supposed to be a pattern of? The fact that we establish a 1-1 correlation is, in principle, 
just the fact that we do so, even if we capture it with a new concept. What would be the 
difference between the concept ‘correlation 1-1 between the individuals of the two 
conceptual extensions’ and the concept of ‘equinumerosity’? 13 Unless we are ready to 
say that the first delivers the application conditions14 and operational resources (via the 
 
13  This is a possibility that even Wright (2001,164) considers as a possible counterargument, 
putting it in terms of whether the ontological commitments would be the same. He does give 
an answer to it, but I must say I am not sure what to make of it. 
14  Although I derive this from the proposed functional conditionalization offered before, 
Dummett comes to suggest too that Frege might be appealing to the truth conditions of the 
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correlation) on whose basis something else is to be proved (as in the case of 
conditionalizing upon functions in the third empiricist option before)15, I fail to see how 
a difference in what each concept is supposed to refer to could be found. If we do follow 
such an explanation, we would say that the 1-1 correlation acts as a functional operator 
(similar to a multiplying one, for example) allowing us to derive a new product. But while 
a standard mathematical operation explains how in using it, we come to something new, 
here we would be doing something different. We are tracing a 1-1- correlation among the 
members of the extension of different concepts and are expected by virtue of it to grasp 
something new there, capturable through a new concept. But, in what sense is this 
extracting a higher order pattern within thought, as Dummett says, and not something 
more similar to the way a concept is extracted from a reality by finding something in 
common between two instances? It is usually explained that, if such a correlation holds, 
 
numerical terms, though not suggesting what I go on to say about a construction of number 
terms through the operational procedure.  
15  It is the possibility of seeing such a procedure as opening a gap, through which the introduction 
per identity of all kind of imagined figures, that forms the core of Field´s arguments against 
Logicism, focusing specifically on the Ontological Argument of the existence of God. However, 
I do think that there is a difference here, to the extent that while in the Ontological Argument we 
require that through mere definition of existential possibility (by way of comparison with what 
there is) there must be such a Being, in the numerical case we are assumed to be able to grasp it 
in what is given to us. In this line also Wright (2001), according to which there would be in the 
numerical case, besides it, true instances of the application of the term. This brings us back, 
however, to the problem of what exactly are the application conditions here. If we adopt the 
functional-operational explanation, we would be assuming that there is a justifiable procedure 
that drives from one to the other. But defending this without the procedure delivering sufficient 
reasons, seems to me problematic on second thoughts. 
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the new numerical concept acts as a second-order conceptual function applied to the first 
concepts (F and G). The new synthesis thereby created in each case is said to be the same 
‘number’. But I am not sure whether with it we really become aware of what is happening 
here and how the pattern is ultimately obtained. We are supposed to do this in view of the 
correlation on the right-hand side. So, let us try to be more specific. One could say, in 
accordance with Frege (1884, §46) that each of the members of the extension is turned 
into such through the concept that encloses it. It is through the concept of an apple that 
we sort out the unities of such. That is, the unities have been conceptually defined as such. 
So, it is upon two sets of such conceptually conformed unities, resulting, that is, out of a 
previous work of conceptualisation, that we are to find the correlation. The 1-1 correlation 
marks the conditions determining where attention should be directed. What he would be 
asking us to grasp is the common pattern in such groups of individuated conceptual 
apprehensions through a new conceptual synthesis. So just as a concept applied to a 
reality sorts out a unity, the concept of the group sorts out one too, a new unity upon 
already conceptualised ones, which would be the number. 
Connecting now to the reasons why the third functional empiricist option does not 
work for the empiricist, it becomes most clear what would be wrong. We have proceeded 
as though talking of a compilation of objects as a starting point would be no problem. We 
took a group of five apples or oranges as our point of contact with experience. But as 
Frege was well aware of, we are in no way appealing to the experientable apples or 
oranges themselves. They can be quite different—big, small, red, green or with different 
shades of orange—but what we expect someone to grasp in this context is the fact that 
they are a given set ‘of unities’ of a sort; what they have been turned into by virtue of 
conceptual differentiation. That is what is relevant in this case. Their ‘being unities’ is 
something that we can just recognise as a result of conceptual work but not as something 
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experientable or abstractable in itself.16. This act of individuation is what makes it 
possible that no matter whether it is apples or half apples that we sort out, they can be 
equal when tracing a 1-1- correlation among the unities of corresponding extensions. 
Whatever we say about them in inferring from their being such a number of unities is 
necessary and certain independently of experience. About this, Frege was, of course, 
right.  
The empiricist ambition, therefore, to get rid of abstract objects by reducing them 
to compilations of objects (when we actually mean their unities), starting from which we 
could then reconstruct functionally upwards what our numerical concepts refer to, is a 
fraud. But the importance this understanding of unities has in the whole Fregean 
enterprise is in my view greater than is commonly acknowledged, since it is upon this 
basis that the second-step proof for recognising the identity of numbers is built. While 
specific singular numbers would be based on this previous conceptual work, the notion 
of a unity allows two possible interpretations: a) the very idea of something being 
separated out through a concept, the content of it (the resulting unity); or, more in line 
 
16  It is important to understand this properly, since the idea is not that the concept makes up the 
reality, in some version of the idea that reality itself should be seen as conceptual. The 
distinctions in reality must previously have been there and recognisable for us first, in order to 
introduce the concept. The point would actually hold up if we were to adopt a version of non-
conceptual contents, since it would be the act of distinguishing (the making of a synthesis upon) 
whatever aspect (even if we should not be talking yet of an intersubjective linguistic normative 
concept) it is that already separates out a unity. Actually, this possibility, that we should have 
this prior capacity, is what Frege would be appealing to when asking us to be able to grasp a 
pattern there, since, even if we should be grasping in a second-order synthesis the result of our 
own conceptualisations, its recognition requires exactly the same capacity as that in the first-order 
one. 
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with the procedure used with the singular numbers, b) the very act of synthesis done 
through the concept. If we follow Dummett in understanding how Frege’s idea of analytic 
unities is to be understood, we should take it that he believes that here we must also do 
with a second-order synthesis upon concepts, since it would be not the conceptual 
synthesis itself but the second-order realisation of what is done in this process. Therefore, 
what Frege would be grasping through the concept of a unity would be what different acts 
of conceptual synthesis have in common, thus option b), the very conceptual unification. 
This makes sense, since this is what we would recognise when ‘turning logical form upon 
itself’ in a second order synthesis, while remaining in the realm of logic. The 
repercussions this will have for Frege´s project goes, in my view, to the very heart of his 
difficulties.  
When asked, then, to recognise in a second-order synthesis the pattern in the 1-1 
correlation at the right-hand side of the equivalence, we would be capturing such 
conceptual unifications (in b) in a new all-embracing one. Representing thereby the 
common pattern between both sides of the correlation.  
Frege is known to have found this procedure unsatisfactory as is expressed in what 
has become known as the Julius Caesar Problem, because if you come to try to introduce 
a new entity per identity, how can you know what it is that you are finding in common 
with the other side of the equivalence if you cannot already presuppose that it is the unities 
that you mean? The fact of there being a correlation might be a pure casualty and what is 
meant is something else present there. Frege’s solution to the difficulty was to opt to 
provide us directly in an already explicit form that it is the extensions that were meant. A 
concept G would be equinumeral to a concept F if its extensions were equivalent: (𝑥)𝐹(𝑥) → 𝐺(𝑥). This change of terms struck me like a sudden jump achieving its goal 
by departing from the careful epistemic derivation he had accustomed us to, to deliver a 
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ready-made product without an explanation of how we came to it. As Wright (1983) 
argues, he seems to have thought that since classes were already part of logic, this was 
legitimate17. But wouldn´t there be an issue too regarding how we came to such classes 
of individuals with their own identity as unities in the first place? However that might be, 
this proposal, known as Basic Law V, delivered Frege’s final understanding of numbers 
as class extensions. These class extensions would have, nevertheless, been constituted by 
equal numbers of unities understood in the sense of b) above. 
3. Unities and how they interweave with Frege´s difficulties  
The problem that arises through the understanding of unities is entrenched in the very 
issues Frege (1879) arrived at in his Begriffschrift with the discovery of variables as 
formal ‘conditions’ for objects. The idea was to be able to reconstruct the common formal 
structure of our thinking and talking about objects. Concepts were understood as 
incomplete functional expressions to which different (numbers of) objects could be 
assigned. This would allow, as he thought, a parallel treatment of numbers. Frege (1884) 
considered his most significant insight to be the idea that, as he said, it was only relative 
to a concept that we can count—just if you consider ‘Books on the table’ you can say 
there are (a, b, c) (if we are to represent each book) or if you consider the ‘Moons of 
Jupiter’ (a, b, c, d, n). Therefore, he concludes that in attributing numbers what we are 
doing is ascribing a given set of unities to a concept. These unities, thus, are not the apples 
or oranges we are experiencing but rather what makes them unities of the sort 
independently of what they exactly are. When he describes what is being done through 
this process Frege tells us  
 
17  Whether classes are part of logic is a disputed matter, see for example Wright (1983, 111) 
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In the sentence: ‘Jupiter has four Moons’ the unity is ‘Jupiter-Moon’. Under this 
concept fall the I as well as the II as well as the III, as well as the IV. That is why 
we can say: that the unity referred to by I is the same as the unity referred to by II, 
and so on. Here we have the Sameness. But when what we assert is the divergence 
of the unities, what we understand is that of the counted things.  (Frege 1884, 42)18  
In using the Roman numerals, he marks the distinction between the objects and the 
unities, thereby stressing that it is only through the concept that we can come to consider 
the different objects falling under it as equal in their being unities, that, as such, we can 
count. That is, when we say that Jupiter has four Moons, what we ascribe is the same as 
we ascribe when we say that there are four Russian armies in Stalingrad; however 
different the armies or the Moons are, what we are ascribing is a given amount to the 
respective concepts.  
We can express this, following Frege, in representing the Moons of Jupiter 
through corresponding unities—not the objects, of course, but placeholders of them, such 
as in ‘Moons of Jupiter’ (()1, ()2, ()3, ()4, ()n). Each would be individualised by the 
conceptual application and not independently of it. Frege dedicated some sections in 
Grundlagen to argue against others who claimed to obtain unities directly through an 
abstractionist process for getting rid of the particularities of an object. Through such a 
process, he argued, we would not end up with an abstract notion of unity, since being a 
unity is not something that we can somehow grasp in experience too (without the 
 
18  I use a more literal translation of the original German edition, even if it might sound a bit 
awkward since I find more clear the way Frege expresses this thought there; marking the 
distinction between the objects and the unities in starker form than might be apparent in the 
English version. Of course, the English translation attempts to say the same and you can read it 
that way too. I just think the original one makes this relevant contrast for the point I want to 
stress more apparent. 
 20 
conceptual work) and then keep stripped of all other properties. It is in this sense that he 
rejected seeing numbers as sets of unities obtained per abstraction from reality. If we got 
rid of the experienced particularities of the reality, nothing would actually be left. Rather, 
in attributing unities to a concept we would be representing how many such conceptual 
individuations we can separate out. But, in this last sense, we do refer to what is common 
to them as such conceptual individuations, as explained in the previous section. If I can 
subsequently draw a correlation with some other concepts’ unities, it will be precisely 
because as conceptually individuated ones they are the same.  
The idea in Begriffschrift of representing the mere possibility of objects falling 
under a concept through conditions (again something like placeholders)19 would allow us 
to make general claims. These conditions would be turned into realities when saturated 
by any real, corresponding individual. However, these placeholders (variables, in normal 
terms) were actually to count as ‘numerical’ (one place) unities differentiated through a 
concept too. The quantifiers, as their name implies, would then help to specify how many 
of such unities we are referring to, whether all of them or at least one, or whether we 
could talk about two of them falling under a concept without having to specify which 
determinate one it was. But here too we are talking about unities. We could say that three 
men crossed the road, without having to specify which particular ones they were. To the 
concept ‘men crossing the road’ three individuals could be assigned. Then we could try 
to see whether this was true, by finding as many corresponding particulars satisfying the 
 
19  We can see an allusion to this in the following quotation:  
This seen, we can also see the following possibility. Instead of linking our chain of 
deduction to any matter of fact, we can leave the fact where it is, while adopting its content 
in the form of a condition. By substituting in this way conditions for facts, throughout the 
whole of a train of reasoning we shall finally reduce it to a form in which a certain result 
is made dependent on a certain series of conditions…It is not impossible that the laws of 
number are of this sort. This would make them analytic judgments despite the fact that 
they would not be discovered by thought alone. (Frege 1884, 23) 
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predicate (no matter those originally meant or others, since in either case the claim would 
be true). The same goes for ‘Jupiter has nine Moons’. I need not know which Moons these 
are to understand it, and if I happen to distinguish a corresponding number of them (even 
if completely different ones20) the claim would be true. Actually, this versatility is very 
important.  
However, Frege´s final goal, as he himself says, was to set the conditions for 
referring to numbers21, to quantify over numbers. So, precisely those numbers that were 
going to end up being understood in Frege’s work as classes of such (conceptually sorted 
out) unities, (capable of representing equally apples, oranges or whatever ‘equinumeral’ 
sets) were supposed to end up being seen as objects saturating those spaces. If we were 
to represent this to aid visualisation, we could picture it as follows: 
1st We obtain possibilities of objects, variables, falling under a concept. Let us 
represent them as this 
 
 
2nd These, we said, could be turned into realities when satisfied by experiential 
objects, such as here 
 
 
3rd But, the idea was to come to see numbers (that are going to be understood as 
classes of unities, as explained) as objects saturating the spaces22 of the variables. 
 
20  Which is not unlikely, since they go up to as many as 79 now, according to NASA 
21  For example, here:  
As I remarked at the beginning, arithmetic was the point of departure for the train of thought that led me to 
my ideography. And that is why I intend to apply it first of all to that science. (Frege 1879, 6) 
22  This can be said of each numerical unity separately as well as for whole classes of them.  
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This is better seen if we first consider the separated numerical unities saturating the 
space of the variables, that amounts to something like this 
 
 
 
What this does, therefore, is to allow us to take ‘possibilities of objects’ (since that is what 
numerical unities23 are when considering the pattern obtained through the concept in the 
sense of b), sec. 2, turned into objects themselves, as saturating the very same possibilities 
of objects represented by the variables; that is, to take possibilities as realities—what we 
might call a Parmenidean monstrosity!—since possibilities define themselves by not-
being. Therefore, if we treat possibilities as realities, as real objects, what we get is that 
Not-Being Is! A paradox thus arises, right at the moment that we are feeding, so to speak, 
the space of a possible object with itself.  
That is, since variables are actually sets of one possible unity, if you saturate them 
with themselves (a unity of the same empty sort, with no determinate reality) you are 
already saying that a corresponding set belongs to itself and taking this path you go 
directly to Russell´s paradox. I will expound this point some more later.  
If we try to follow Frege’s original line of thought, as developed in section 2., it 
required giving the obtained unities derived through conceptualization, and assigned to 
the corresponding concept, an identity as specific singular numbers. This, it seems to me, 
demands that we first establish an identity among unities in isolation24, a process through 
 
23  These numerical unities can already be considered equivalent to number one, since they 
represent the pattern obtained by sorting out what is common to two such conceptualized 
unifications. Figure 1. below refers to their obtention.  
24  This would seem to cohere with Frege’s own thought process, which considered essential 
the process of identity to talk of numerical unities, as expressed for example here: 
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which we would obtain a synthesis of the conceptual unification in terms of b) above. 
This would be needed if we are to be able to identify what is it that is meant by the 1-1 
correlation, since identifying the whole set of unities presupposes being able to identify 
the individual ones. Recognition of the whole would then be achieved through the 
equivalence relation between unities, through which one obtains corresponding empty 
entities (possibilities of classes of unities) that could be represented then shortened into 
the entity 5; since if the unities are conceptual, so is the unity of unities that the numerical 
concept introduces.  
Figure 1.  
On the left has been represented the identity of two conceptually sorted out unities, on 
the right the identity of the whole group. The patterns thereby obtained correspond in the 
case of the unity to the conceptual unification (in the sense of (b) sec.2.). The alternative 
possibility of having captured the content of the unity, as suggested in option (a) sec.2., 
is marked through the small black square. In the case of the identity of the group, the 
common pattern to both sides of the correlation, embracing all such previously identified 
conceptual unities, is represented in figure 2.  
 
 Is the dog conscious however dimly in that common element in two situations which we 
express by the word ‘one’? (Frege 1884, 42) 
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Figure 2.  
Now, repeating the procedure of taking singular numbers as objects saturating our 
variables, we are allowing the new corresponding entity, the specific singular number (in 
darker grey), to take the place of this possibility of class as though it were a reality  
Figure 3.  
If this is finally understood, as Frege does through his Basic Law V, as a class of 
equinumeral extensions, and we repeat the procedure of taking singular numbers as 
objects saturating our variables, we come to obtain Russell´s paradox.  
There are several things to comment here. To start with, it should be noticed that 
in this process the paradox actually presents itself twice: first at the level of unities, as 
explained before—what we might call a ‘First-Level Paradox’; and then, at the level of 
class extensions—a ‘Second-Level Paradox’. Another aspect I wish to comment on is the 
step that I have included in Frege´s process requiring an identity for a unity first. It seems 
to me that the lack of one is related to the difficulties Frege found in Hume´s principle 
expressed in his Julius Caesar Problem. Maybe Frege initially believed it sufficient to 
have determined what ascriptions of unities to concepts amount to. But, identifying their 
‘unicity’, what is meant by such, as expressed in a second-order pattern dissected within 
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the very conceptual synthesis issued by the specific concepts, seems to me not to be done 
with it yet.25 Once we have already sorted out the pattern of the unity, it could have been 
argued that it is not the object or something else we mean, since in obtaining the pattern 
of the whole we are already working upon the extracted unity patterns.  
In general terms, this reconstruction seems to me to allow one to see more clearly 
a deeper source of difficulties in Frege´s project than that usually considered to have 
doomed the project to failure from early on. But we have so far given no consideration to 
what a proper reconstruction would have to look like, and that is what I want to try next. 
4. Flipping things around 
Understanding the difficulties that Frege arrived at requires understanding the whole scale 
of what he had attempted to do, his whole understanding of logical form and how he 
thought the grasping of it took place. As we saw, Frege included in his understanding of 
logical form the conceptual conformation of objects and the necessary relations through 
which we reason about them in our linguistic discourse, equally capturable through a 
second-order conceptual synthesis. So, if at a first level we were to conceptualise the 
world linguistically and establish such connections, at a second one we would capture the 
structure of this very work of conceptualisation, the formal unification introduced by our 
concepts and the implications traced among them, by way of new concepts. Remaining 
all the way through within the limits of the formal domain. This last step is to be 
differentiated from the idea of capturing, through a higher-order concept, an already 
conceptually understood reality. It is more like capturing the very act of capturing, the 
unifying synthesis thereby taking place.  
 
25  Consider the previous footnote.  
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The way Frege understands what is achieved through this second-order 
conceptualisation is essential to his project. Therefore, I wish to consider first, how the 
route of interpretation he took affects the understanding of the objects he was after, and 
where the alternative would have led. And secondly, I will focus on the understanding of 
the logical connections at the first-order level and the idea of a second-order 
conceptualisation of their patterns.  
 
4.1. The objects we were after  
Frege’s central idea—that it is relative to concepts that we can count—together with his 
realisation that we could represent the role of objects through corresponding ‘conditions’, 
were the two important moves that connected his ‘objectual’ reconstruction of logical 
form with the arithmetical understanding of number. But, although what he finally 
represented as the numerical unities was the very form of the unification done through 
the concept, and thus the concept of the unity, his intention was to differentiate between 
the logical unities (the variables) and the rightly so-called numerical ones. The second 
were supposed to be the objects of the former (as also, later, the specific numbers). 
Therefore, I think that while, among the options drawn at the end of section 2, he was 
actually aiming at a), the resulting content of the unification, what he ended up 
representing was b) the concept of the unity. This was not without reasons, of course; it 
was all that he could allow himself, if he was to remain within the boundaries of the 
formal framework, he had set himself. He thought he could do well enough with the 
formality of the unity, since the alternative in a) went beyond the logico-linguistic realm 
representing the result of the synthesis done by the concept into something other. 
Probably a key aspect of it was that he was paying less attention to the notion of the unity 
he was arriving at and more to the possibility of obtaining the pattern of the whole 
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conceptual extension through a second-order synthesis, which he hoped could achieve his 
aim. But since this second synthesis was done on behalf of what were already conceptual 
ones, what he obtained was again of a conceptual, formal nature.  
What would the alternative have looked like? Where would route a) have taken 
us? What are the numbers we would have arrived at and how are they to be understood? 
I think that the metaphor of ‘figuring out’ what it is that we are doing when separating 
out a unity through a concept into some background extension, into something other to 
itself, into a virtual representation of reality itself, is more than a metaphor. I think the 
only way to make sense of this is through a representation that requires both sides: what 
the concept does, and its counterpart, what it does it upon. In this way we can gain not 
just the concept of a unity but what it is a concept of. This way of putting things brings 
us back to something akin to Kantian transcendental Intuition.  
Actually, if we are to properly comprehend what it is that we are doing through 
conceptual application we have to represent not just the concept but the whole 
background extension of conceptual activity, since differentiating something from 
something else always requires some extension where the severed out remains in a 
different position at some level other than that from which it detaches itself. An 
illustration of the process might be helpful to see better, 
Figure 1.  
 
Although conceptual demarcations normally take place in reality, pre-existent differences 
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being necessary for us to discriminate conceptually upon, to understand what is it that we 
do in conceptual use we must represent it to ourselves, such as in Figure 1. Since we 
cannot really be said to perceive the result of our own conceptual labour, such 
representation enables us to get a proper grasp of it. This way we can separate out what 
is taking the place of reality, the extension in the horizontal line, and what is done through 
conceptualisation in separating out a unity by way of using a concept. On the basis of 
such a representation, we can then better understand what we mean by talk of ‘being’ 
(being real), ‘being something’, being ‘an object’ from the perspective of a concept; we 
can differentiate what becomes a real unity (symbolised by the 1 in Figure 1.), a Moon of 
Jupiter or whatever, and what is not (symbolised by the 0).  
The importance of representing the conceptualisation in its context, is that through 
it we can also realise that what remains outside the conceptualized, 0, has its own part in 
the process, since on the one hand it makes 1 actually possible as a unity (otherwise both 
would be the same undifferentiated whole). However, at the same time it is cut off as ‘not 
being’, that is, not being there to be counted in the Fregean conceptual sense, and is, 
therefore, literally 0. Now, through this process 0 becomes ‘some kind of unity’ too, 
through being separated out, but one that ‘is-not’ from a countable perspective. Thus, it 
exists, but not in any linguistically accountable sense: it is nothing. Mystifying as it might 
sound, this represents I believe, the noumenons, non-beings, limits of language and 
silences of our literature.  
If this interpretation is right, then maybe the insight to be gained is that 0 is not to 
be defined as the class of all objects that are not identical to themselves, as Frege said, 
but rather as ‘what remains outside of any class’26, since if counting, as well as in the 
 
26  Someone might wonder how we then explain the existence of empty classes, if we cannot say 
that there are classes with 0 members. This doubt was expressed by Peter Simons at a Conference 
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representation we can make of it through Imagination27, is always counting from a 
perspective (virtually ad infinitum) 0 is always what can never be included. Also, if we 
were to count all there is, being, since this requires a perspective too, it must be 
conceptually detached, leaving something outside—the consequence thereof being, 
which can hardly be news, that no account of what there is can ever be complete.  
A further consequence of this perspective is that it would allow to answer 
problems such as those relative to the truth of negative sentences that interested Russell. 
Since in any complete account of the individuals existent in a world, given by the 
conjunctive set of conceptually individuated ones, 0 would always have to be taken to 
exist. Therefore, negative sentences would be true, because now we must say that there 
is something, 0, that is somehow there too. But how do we explain a sentence such as 
“there is no rhinoceros in the room”? Since that doesn´t just say that there is nothing in 
the room, but what kind of individual there-is-not. In a sense, it is absurd to say that “that 
nothing” that exists in the room is of one kind rather than another. But we do want to 
speak that way, that there is nothing relative to a specific concept and in that sense to 
speak of possibilities of this and that, that do not exist in this world. So maybe we could 
also represent such non-existence, but we have to differentiate such representations from 
 
on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism 1918-2018 at the Complutense University in Madrid on 
the 28.01.2019. My answer would be the following: saying that an empty set has one peculiar 
member not identical with itself which happens not to exist is not accurate, since it would be like 
saying its content is a Meinongian figure. By this account, on the contrary, we are saying 
precisely that what corresponds to such a class is non-existence (not as a mere modal issue). It 
captures no reality. We can write 0, but we need not say that it is a peculiar impossible entity.  
27  Since ‘Imagination’ is meant in a sense akin to the Kantian notion of Pure Transcendental 
Imagination I will use it with a capital ‘I’ to make this more explicit.  
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those of existence. So, on the one hand they would be forms of 0, but relative to a concept, 
giving rise to corresponding unities of such sort, they would ‘exist’ in the negative way 
of 0, we could represent them as the result of conceptualising in that realm. That is, they 
would correspond to the negative numbers. This are, of course, tentative approaches, but 
I think, they are worth considering.  
 
4.2. The logical rules  
Going now back to the understanding of logical rules in Frege’s picture, and actually in 
Logical Empiricism more generally, we distinguished at the first level conceptualisations 
and inferential relations whose patterns were likely to be reconstructed conceptually again 
at a higher, second-order level. A first question, then, is how the inferential relations 
themselves, at the first level, are justified in this picture. Frege explains how we might 
recognise and conceptualise new patterns in our linguistic discourse, but how these are 
introduced in the first place, why we put them forward with inferential necessity, is not 
explained. It is also insufficiently explained in the conventionalist picture, as we briefly 
saw in discussing Formalism. As Coffa (1991, Ch.14) argues, the solution given by 
Wittgenstein and Carnap to the problem of the a priori was to turn things around: instead 
of saying that we grasp the meaning of logical constants or geometrical undefinable terms 
through some form of intuition (or Intuition in the geometrical case), deriving then from 
them further axioms and a priori truths, it is the methods of measuring and those axioms 
themselves, or the logical rules in the case of the constants, that determine meaning, this 
being the reason why their truth struck us as necessary. But this just delays the question, 
since our problem now is how we come to those rules that determine the constitution of 
meaning, how we derive their necessity if it is not to be seen as conventional. We have 
singled out two models: a) meaning determines rules and requires intuition (or Intuition); 
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b) rules determine meaning and the necessity of rules is therefore seen as unquestionably 
presumed, unless we reject meaning as a whole. This, Coffa argues, was initially shown 
for the field of Geometry by Poincaré and Gilbert, for whom the measurements and 
axioms of Geometry defined primitive notions such as ‘distance’, and not the other way 
around. But then we are driven back to the question of the origin of those rules that define 
the semantic primitives.28  
My proposal now is to see how this problem turns out from the perspective we 
have adopted, if we were to accept that understanding the very idea of unities, and 
therefore the very notion of measurement units, requires representation of what it is to 
obtain a unity (in general) through conceptualisation in some virtual representation of the 
extended context upon which it takes place. Then, whatever conclusions we might derive 
in thinking about them would apply to whichever units and conceptual applications we 
were talking about. Again, visualising might be helpful,  
Figure 2. 
 
 
If we depart from Figure 1 above (t1 in Figure 2), once we have this representation of 
what severing a unity from its background amounts to, we can come to a few further 
 
28  According to Coffa, Wittgenstein was aware of this problem and thought that ‘grammar’ itself 
could not be regarded as conventional; there was a way grammar should be, but no justification 
could be given not requiring a justification itself in an infinite regress. 
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conclusions. We can, for example, come to realise that if the conceptual detachment did 
not take place, the unity, 1, gained thereby would not be a unity at all. This necessary 
conclusion is not gained through some mysterious capacity of intuition, but simply 
because in modifying things through Imagination in some extension akin to Kantian 
Intuition, we can come to see it, as pictured in the transition from t1 to t2 in Figure 2 where 
the vertical line is taken away. We literally see that the very existence of the generated 
unity is only the case through its being differentiated from what remains outside of it; 
were it not so, it doesn´t exist as a unity. Since this represents any unity whatsoever, as 
we said, it applies generally and therefore necessarily in all cases. In other words, this 
allows the introduction of a necessary connection 𝑁𝑜𝑡	0	 → 	𝑁𝑜𝑡	1. Starting from here, 
we can also come to conclude that for this unity, 1, to be itself, the unity we might identify 
with the singular term ‘1’, it cannot be whatever other (conceptualised or not) it leaves 
outside, call it ‘Not 1’, in this case 0. Otherwise, as Frege in his own context puts it, we 
go back to an undifferentiated whole. We see, then, how through this very rudimentary 
process we can come to a first law of identity, expressing exactly that ′1′ →𝑁𝑜𝑡	(′𝑁𝑜𝑡	1′), equivalent in more standard terms to this other 𝛼 → 	¬(¬𝛼	).29 These 
simple relations hold from the very fact of something being differentiated as a unity and, 
since this is what characterises any object conformation whatsoever, it will necessarily 
apply to any relation among objects we happen to consider. 
However simple this reconstruction might seem, I think it stands, and coheres, for 
example, with some counterfactual reconstructions of necessity. The idea is that the 
capacity to Imaginatively represent general epistemic contexts in ‘Intuition’ in order to 
 
29  Notice that while with the numbers 1 and 0 we move at the ontological level of unities, by 
using names for them we are identifying them linguistically. The same goes for the 
representation in terms of 𝛼	𝑎𝑛𝑑	¬𝛼.  
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keep them fixed and allow them to be modified easily (while keeping the different 
moments of the transition present, moving back and forth between them)30 allows us to 
understand how the most basic logical rules themselves come to stand. Showing that they 
are not primitive and, in that sense, not a priori given in our cognitive equipment but 
developed — although we should be taking them, once acquired, as a priori justified for 
further uses—. We can study what is or is not possible by virtue of what actually happens 
when introducing such modifications and advance on that basis what is necessary. Since 
here what we are reconstructing, as explained, is the constitution of inferential relations 
affecting any unity on the grounds of being such, we have to do with a general idea. That 
is, it is not because other unities should be similar to this one that we are allowed to make 
a generalising inference, requiring an explanation of a supposedly pre-existent capacity 
of so inferring. It is rather that the represented unity is instantiated in any occurrent one; 
and so, the question—how do you know that you can infer from this case to all others? 
—does not pose itself. It would be tantamount to asking: how do you know that what 
happens to this, happens to this? Notice too, that advancing the first inference, its 
necessity, is simply a matter of acknowledging, as a matter of fact, that this ‘unity’ ceases 
to be what it is if some conditions are removed. Since, again, we have to do with a general 
claim, this will be so in all cases, and thus we can advance an inferential claim.  
Returning now to the previous conventionalist idea, by picturing the basics of 
arithmetic in these terms we would be explaining the constitution of those very 
 
30  This is an essential feature in Kant (1781 KrV A101-102, 230) and I think an essential one in 
any reconstruction we are to give of such a background extension. As he points out in the 
paragraph ‘On the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination’:  
Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought or think of the time from one noon to the 
next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one 
of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose 
the preceding representations (…) then no whole representation (…) could ever arise 
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measurement units and the further necessary conclusions we advance on their basis 
whereupon meanings can then be said to be built. We would thus be delivering a deeper 
constitutive account of the a priori. This would not deliver a justification of the laws then 
requiring, in an infinite regress, a further justification for it (as Wittgenstein argued), but 
rather simply depicts their very constitution. The difference with the Kantian picture is 
that here the constitution of logic too comes out as synthetic a priori. That is, if it is right, 
as argued, that representation in ‘Intuition’ is required in order to arrive at the notion of 
necessity and the necessity of identity, then the conclusion to be drawn is that not just 
mathematics but also logic is synthetic a priori. Furthermore, since inferential connections 
emerge as derived from more basic distinctions (Figure 1), we appear to come closer to a 
computational picture of human’s most rudimentary cognitive capacities. 
The contrast between this picture and a traditional reconstruction of the 
undefinable concepts of geometry, for example, as synthetic a priori, on the other hand, 
is that in putting arithmetic and thereupon derived logical laws as more basic first, they 
are no longer primitives, but could, nevertheless, be explained further in the 
conventionalist way. All these results are put down with care for the weight I know they 
carry, but I want to put them down for further reflection. What is clear is that whatever 
this might otherwise imply, this way of looking at things definitively turns things around 
for Frege´s project.  
One last point I must return to is the idea I have been putting forward that Frege 
actually reintroduces the idea of the synthetic a priori even if he claims to do away with 
any recourse to anything like experience or Intuition. This relates to the role of the second-
order synthesis of deductive patterns ‘within thought’, as Dummett puts it. From Frege´s 
perspective, since it all takes place in the logic-linguistic realm they can safely be 
regarded as analytic. The idea of there being such second-order patterns of reasoning 
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procedures seems to me perfectly fine. But the question is, whether understanding the 
necessity of such reasoning procedures, grasping their pattern, is at all possible without 
going all the way down to their application in the first-order realm? Whether we could 
make any sense of them without figuring out, as we have argued, what their application 
in some counterpart extension amounts to? Think of it this way. Take the three models of 
a priori necessity considered: 1) meaning determines rules; that is why, in knowing the 
meaning of a term, we can immediately (a priori) see that the predicate belongs to the 
understanding of the subject; 2) conventionalist, model, we said that it is actually because 
the rules themselves determine meaning that this is the case. Frege would actually say 
something along these second lines, since it is in grasping new patterns of such rules that 
we come to a new synthesis. But if we now, 3) constitutive model, ask ourselves how 
such rules themselves come to stand, we conclude that it is through such a representation 
of what being an object31 amounts to that we can derive some further necessary relations 
with other objects. So, we end up building the different models upon each other (in 
inverse order), with the ultimate one giving sense to the necessity of the others. And this, 
in a way that cannot be dismissed as being merely the triggering origin that says nothing 
to an a priori knowledge we would grasp as having been always necessarily there,32 since 
it is the very grounds for why such rules are introduced as certain at all. Would we not 
then have rather to say that the (supposedly analytic) synthesis built thereupon, is 
ultimately understandable on this basis? Is Frege then, inadvertedly, ultimately appealing 
to that which he had wanted to ban, that is, the synthetic a priori in a more traditional 
sense? On the other hand, there is also an issue with the idea itself of a second synthesis 
 
31  Of course, the idea of an object is meant here in much more general sense than the usual one. 
32  Frege argues that the fact that experience (or here Intuition) might be the source is irrelevant for 
the justification of the claims. This is true once the claims are already obtained, of course.  
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obtaining a pattern required for conceptualisation, since the very act of doing so and not 
deriving it from experience is precisely what Kant characterises as a synthesis a priori. 
From the Kantian perspective it would not be that we grasp it, but that we can get it 
because we ourselves do it.  
5. But then, what are numbers?  
Well, before we make ourselves a picture of the singular numbers, if doing so requires 
prior identification of the unities that conform their extensions, we must first ask what 
unities are. The answer would not be the concepts of unities, as it ended up being for 
Frege, but rather what we can represent as the result of applying concepts; something like 
shadowy representations of real unities through Imagination. This is what Frege himself 
realised at the end of his life and what Kant said. But these are no realities, for reality 
requires still something further: corresponding unifications in experience, which result 
from the application of specific concepts to specific experience.  
Frege´s difficulties arise if we understand his proposal in terms of b), as the 
concept of the unity, and then understand them as objects saturating variables. Doing so 
gave us the First-Level Paradox, a one-possible unity inside another, representable 
through a unitary set with another unitary subset as its object, such as this: 𝑈 = ((𝑥)). 
The initial unity now contains the numerical (conceptual) unity, and its occupiable space 
as its subset. The new empty unity in the subset could be saturated again and again by 
another and another one-place unity, giving rise to unities with increasing members, and 
the question is whether this recursive process is not paradoxical in itself. However, I 
believe the most important problem is that it raises a version of Russell´s paradox, which 
we might call the Paradox of the Unity (or unitary set) since the question would be 
whether the set of all (unitary) should or should not include itself as a member. If it 
includes itself as a member, can it still be considered the set of all? Since as a member it 
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is not the set of all anymore unless it includes itself again (and then again recursively), it 
cannot really include itself without ceasing to be what it is; however, if it does not include 
itself, it is no longer the set of all. If we have a set with one possible individual as a 
member, and we allow number one (understood as a set of one possible member) to be a 
possible substitution instance, we are doing exactly what we have described: allowing our 
set to include itself, with the consequence of sabotaging its very possibility of being the 
set of all possible one individuals anymore, since as an instance it is not. But if we do not 
allow number one as an instance, it could not be the set of all possible one individuum 
either (since number one is to be considered one such). 
By considering numerical unities now as Imaginative representations of the real 
individuals obtained by conceptual application, we are simply representing the results of 
conceptualisation. So, the situation is a different one: numerical unities are then being 
used as mere (non-saturable) representatives of individuated realities in order to figure 
out things about relations among them. Being representatives not of factive reality but of 
what individual reality is like, they therefore need not constrain themselves to a real 
number of individuals but can exceed this with ease (ad infinitum). Since such 
representatives are not sets, no paradox applies.  
One last question I wish to address is the status of such Imaginative 
representations. I have not made it clear whether I am referring to a mental representation 
or whether we are talking of possible intersubjective representations. In Kant´s own 
transcendental philosophy, the point was that such synthetic a priori knowledge is not 
obtained per exceptional capacities of direct intuition of something going beyond the 
realm of experience. This view amounts to reopening the door to transcendent 
metaphysics with all its potentially intuitable creatures. Rather, it is when we try to 
reconstruct how it is possible that we arrive at something not derived from experience, if 
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not by such means that we try to represent to ourselves how this must take place for things 
to be how they are for us. I think this is right in the sense that, as previously said, we 
cannot claim to epistemically perceive our own conceptual conformation of unities, for 
example, but rather come to grasp what is it that we do when representing this very 
performance to ourselves. But the question is how this exactly takes place. In the Kantian 
model, it is actually in abstracting the experiential (in the sense of stripping it away) from 
our recognition of already singled-out objects that we come to realise that there is 
something that we are taking for granted about them, but which cannot be said to have 
been experienced or grasped by special faculties. In this way too, in Kant’s view, we 
would come to the consciousness of pure spatiotemporal Intuition. It too, is understood 
ultimately as a form of a priori synthesis (remitting to the a priori synthesis of 
apperception). We would realise that in our very ordering of impressions in our keeping 
of their transition present, there is also something, not in itself experientable but which is 
necessary for our knowledge of experience to be possible at all. The contemporary critic 
would see a problem in the mentalistic aspect of such a reconstruction, but things could 
be put the other way around. We can come to represent in intersubjective sharing ways, 
virtual computer representations, architectonic schemes or pictures, formal universal 
aspects of our reality, because we must be capable of schematising them in some such 
form. We can all agree in view of such shared depicted representations, but it must be 
because we can recognise something there, the same structure that enables us to come 
personally to depict it in such a way in the first place. I am afraid there is much too discuss 
on this point, so I will have to leave it here. 
There are many other issues open for further thought. One, for example, is to what 
extent the proposal put forward is coincident with positions such as those of Brouwer or 
Dummett, who defend understanding numbers as synthetic a priori too. This is something 
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I still have to think about. I have intentionally remained relatively neutral about how the 
background extension is to be understood, in order to reserve myself the right to think 
further on the extent to which I share the Kantian picture as a whole and make up my 
mind on such matters. Another issue is whether the position outlined implies that numbers 
are constructed or not, or whether the possibility of such representations reproducing 
themselves ad infinitum is enough to consider them given—which actually seems a 
plausible option, since Wittgenstein´s ‘Rules as Rails’ picture, which in the standard 
conceptual case fails (for the need of human assessment to determine further conceptual 
application), appears perfectly unproblematic in this one. Finally, the initial question of 
how we are to come to the singular number from here, although I think it enables a 
reconstruction in some such representative terms, is left for a further occasion too. 
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